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INTRODUCTION
It is a fair and reasonable demand on the part of a sovereign
that the air over its territory should not be polluted on a great
scale by sulphurous acid gas, that the forests on its mountains,
be they better or worse, and whatever domestic destruction
they have suffered, should not be further destroyed or threat-
ened by the act of persons beyond its control, that the crops and
orchards on its hill should not be endangered from the same
source.
1
* J.D., 2015, Duquesne University School of Law; B.S., 2012, The Pennsylvania State
University. The author would like to thank Professor Martha Jordan for her instrumental
guidance in writing this article, and AES for quickening the author's awareness of this issue.
1. Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 238 (1907).
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When the states by their union made the forcible abatement of
outside nuisances impossible to each, they did not thereby
agree to submit to whatever might be done. They did not re-
nounce the possibility of making reasonable demands on the
ground of their still remaining quasi-sovereign interests; and
the alternative to force is a suit in this [C]ourt.2
In 1907, based upon the foregoing, the United States Supreme
Court created a cause of action for states injured from air contami-
nation, heedless of state boundaries, as well as an implied call to
Congress to address the issue. To be sure, the crux of the problem
is if downwind pollution is left unregulated, the emitting or upwind
state reaps the benefits of the economic activity causing the pollu-
tion without bearing all the costs. 3 Cross-state air pollution pro-
vides a unique problem: transient by its nature, as air pollution
travels out of state, upwind states are relieved of the associated
costs, which are borne instead by downwind states whose ability to
achieve and maintain national air quality standards is systemically
hampered by the steady stream of infiltration pollution.
After a series of legislative enactments, Congress delegated the
newfound authority to regulate emissions that cross state lines to
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which became known
as the Good Neighbor Provision of the Clean Air Act (CAA). 4 Since
then, rule promulgations by the EPA have been the ongoing subject
of judicial scrutiny;5 each has met a fate either in failure or requir-
ing remand to the EPA to create a rule consistent with its statutory
grant of authority.6 The EPA's tumultuous history for rendering
regulations that fail constitutional muster necessarily raises the
question, how can the EPA continually be wrong in enacting regu-
lations to effectuate the Good Neighbor Provision?
Over the years, agencies like the EPA have been afforded great
deference. 7 This deference gives agencies and their unelected offi-
cials the confidence to push the limits of their authority by making
audacious policy-based decisions, sometimes in derogation of more
2. Id. at 237.
3. See Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Interstate Environmental Externalities, 144
U. PA. L. REV. 2341, 2343 (1996). Conversely, downwind states to which the pollution travels
are unable to achieve clean air because of the influx of out-of-state pollution they lack au-
thority to control. See S. Rep. No. 101-228, p. 49 (1989).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(E).
5. See infra notes 9, 28, and 35.
6. See, e.g., infra note 46.
7. See E. Donald Elliot, Chevron Matters: How the Chevron Doctrine Redefined the Roles
of Congress, Courts, and Agencies in Environmental Law, 16 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 5 (2005).
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appropriate and conservative legal decisions.8 In the midst of this
lies the United States Supreme Court, teetering in a muddled in-
tersection between adherence to stare decisis and the practice of
giving deference to administrative agencies. As a product of the
Court's internal battle, the superior methodology applied in statu-
tory interpretation issues involving administrative agencies is
seemingly unclear. As explained by Justice Scalia:
I know of no case, in the entire history of the federal courts, in
which [the Court has] allowed a judicial interpretation of a
statute to be set aside by an agency-or ha[s] allowed a lower
court to render an interpretation of a statute subject to correc-
tion by an agency. 9
The EPA promulgated the Transport Rule to quantify states'
Good Neighbor obligations regarding sister states. 10 That is, the
Transport Rule is a regulation that the EPA enacted, anchored by
the rule-making power given to it by Congress via the CAA, to abate
ambient pollutant particles that are transported to downwind
states causing potentially serious health problems.1 In enacting
the Transport Rule, the EPA necessarily had to interpret the Good
Neighbor Provision. However, its own statutory interpretation is
not the only cornerstone on which the EPA had to rely when prom-
ulgating the Transport Rule; its interpretation must also be guided
by prior case law. As a result, the validity of the Transport Rule
hinges on whether the EPA acted within its statutory authority and
whether its interpretation of the Good Neighbor Provision was con-
stitutional.
This comment seeks to explore how the Court erred in analyzing
the EPA's interpretation of the CAA, and how the Court should
have decided the issue by minimizing the deference accorded to the
EPA's interpretations. Part I of this article discusses the historical
background of the CAA, the evolution of the Good Neighbor Provi-
sion and regulations purporting to effectuate Good Neighbor obli-
gations, including the current Transport Rule. Part II of this article
analyzes how the Transport Rule is in derogation of the EPA's stat-
utory authority and how the United States Supreme Court erred in
according deference to the EPA in upholding the mechanics of the
8. See id. at 11-12.
9. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 248-49 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (em-
phasis added).
10. Approvals, 76 Fed. Reg. 48,208 (Aug. 8, 2011) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52,
72, 78, 97) [hereinafter Transport Rule].
11. See generally id.
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Transport Rule. Lastly, this article concludes that the EPA should
not have been awarded any deference under the seminal deference
regime provided by Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC.12
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. Statutory Evolution
Originally, the school of thought on how to address the issue of
cross-state air contamination was premised on the notion that
states could negotiate abatement on their own; the affected down-
wind states would initiate negotiations with the upwind-polluter
states by offering payment in exchange for pollution abatement. 13
Though this utopian idea of deferring to the states may be a true
Federalist's dream, it proved wanting for some kind of federal gov-
ernment intervention.1 4 In 1962, this motivated promulgation of
the CAA.
In 1970, in order to remedy the complex mechanism in place for
abatement of interstate air pollution,1 5 Congress began to amend
the CAA, starting with a structure that, predominantly, remains
the same today. Congress delegated to the EPA the responsibility
of establishing national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) for
ambient pollutant particles that "cause or contribute to air pollu-
tion which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health
or welfare. '16 The CAA also requires that, once the EPA has estab-
lished the NAAQS, the burden shifts to the states to craft a state
implementation plan designed to get the state to attain the
12. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
13. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15 (1960) (explaining,
in more general terms, that a downwind state would bargain with a polluting upwind state
by paying the upwind-polluter in exchange for reducing emissions downwind).
14. In the seminal case to address the issue of cross-state air contamination, the Supreme
Court of the United States saw the true problem with voluntary interstate bargaining: the
State of Georgia took to the courts only after "a vain application to the State of Tennessee for
relief [in the form of pollution abatement]." Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. at 236 (1907). In
effect, payment is an incentive for a polluter state to abate its emissions; however, initiating
emission controls proves a costly endeavor and absent a mandatory regulation requiring
emissions reduction, the burden on upwind states overpowers incentives proposed by down-
wind states.
15. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857d(c)-(g) (1964). Later, during the 1970's, Congress recognized the
1963 mechanism for abatement of interstate air pollution to be "cumbersome, time consum-
ing, and unwieldy." H.R. REP. NO. 95-294, at 330 (1977). Thus, Congress came to terms with
the need for amendments. Id.
16. 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1)(A) (2010). This provision is found in Title I of the CAA. Id.
Additionally, Title I also requires the EPA to divide the country into designated areas. Id.
at § 7407(c). These designated areas are christened as either "nonattainment," id. at §
7407(d)(1)(A)(i), "attainment," id. at 7407(d)(1)(A)(ii), or "unclassifiable," id. at
7407(d)(1)(A)(iii), as the air quality pertains to each of the air pollutants on the NAAQS.
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NAAQS. 17 These initial amendments sparked a series of later and
more progressive amendments that addressed the issue of cross-
state air contamination.
Using this amended structure of the CAA, Congress required
state plans to include "adequate provisions for intergovernmental
cooperation" on interstate air pollution.18 However, the EPA did
not interpret this new requirement to be a "binding enforcement
agreement."1 9 As a result, state enforcement did not occur and "se-
rious inequities among several States" persisted.20
Continuance, rather than elimination of the problem, forced Con-
gress to conclude that the 1970 Amendment was "an inadequate
answer to the problem of interstate air pollution[J" so Congress
amended the CAA again in 1977 in yet another attempt to "estab-
lish an effective mechanism for prevention, control, and abatement
of interstate air pollution. '21 This time, Congress's goal for the new
amendment was to "mak[e] a source at least as responsible for pol-
luting another State as it would be for polluting its own State. '22 In
order to bring this to fruition, Congress adopted the Good Neighbor
Provision, which requires that all state plans include "adequate"
provisions "prohibiting any stationary source within the [s]tate
from emitting any air pollutant in amounts which will prevent at-
tainment or maintenance [of the NAAQS] for any other State."23
Unfortunately, despite Congress's effort to hold upwind states ac-
countable, this version of the Good Neighbor Provision ultimately
proved inadequate. 24
17. 42 U.S.C § 7410(a)(1). The CAA also provides that if a state submits an inadequate
state plan or fails to submit a state plan altogether, then the EPA is required to administer
a federal implementation plan (federal plan). See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410(c)(1)(A)-(B). These 1970
amendments reflected Congress's effort to "sharply increase[ federal authority and respon-
sibility in the continuing effort to combat air pollution." Train v. NRDC, 421 U.S. 60, 64
(1975).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(2)(E).
19. NRDC v. EPA, 483 F.2d 690, 692 (8th Cir. 1973).
20. S. REP. No. 95-127, at 47 (1977).
21. H.R. REP. No. 95-294, at 330 (1977).
22. S. REP. No. 95-127, at 48 (1977).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(E) (Supp. II 1977) (emphasis added). This provision is com-
monly referred to as the original "Good Neighbor Provision." Id.
24. Specifically, this provision's demise was rooted in semantics. As written, any upwind
state would be in violation of the provision only if it "prevented attainment" in a downwind
state. However, due to the nature of cross-state air pollution, something akin to a spaghetti-
like matrix, it most often proved "impossible to say that any single source or group of sources
is the one which actually prevents attainment." S. REP. No. 101-228, at 49 (1989) (emphasis
added). Furthermore, the provision only applied to "single sources," which made it inappli-
cable to prohibiting emissions from multiple sources. Id. at 21. Ambient air pollution is a
complicated process. Once emissions are put into the atmosphere, they immediately mix with
pollutant particles and depending on the wind, will be "transported" to downwind states.
However, due to the very nature of the wind, one day an upwind state is classified as an
Summer 2015 633
Duquesne Law Review
In 1990, Congress put its quill to the paper again, extending the
Good Neighbor Provision to encompass emissions from multiple
sources, which "eliminat[ed] the need to establish a causal relation-
ship between a polluted state and violation of an ambient stand-
ard.''25 This amendment provides that state plans must "[c]ontain
adequate provisions prohibiting.., any source or other type of emis-
sions activity within the State from emitting any air pollutant in
amounts which will contribute significantly to nonattainment in, or
interference with maintenance by, any other state with respect to
any such [NAAQS]." 26  After this amendment, the EPA subse-
quently began a series of rulemakings to enforce the Good Neighbor
Provision.
B. Regulatory Evolution with Judicial Intervention
The CAA grants the EPA authority to create necessary regula-
tions to enforce the Good Neighbor Provision.27 After the most re-
cent amendments to the CAA in 1990, the EPA established the "NOx
upwind, while the next it is a downwind. This spaghetti-like matrix makes finding a causal
connection between a single source polluter and a specific downwind nonattainment area an
arduous task.
25. S. REP. No. 101-228, at 75 (1989).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D)(i)() (emphasis added). This was the 1990 amendment to
the Good Neighbor Provision and remains, unchanged, as the current reading of the Good
Neighbor Provision today.
27. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(E).
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SIP Call," the first regulation to enforce the Good Neighbor Provi-
sion.28 This rule addressed NO. emissions by quantifying obliga-
tions of the upwind states via the Good Neighbor Provision. 29 The
NO. SIP Call required states to submit plans that set statewide
ozone season NO. budgets with the overarching goal of reducing
NO. emissions within the state; in effect, this reduces the amount
of NO. transported across states.30 In Michigan v. EPA, the NO.
SIP Call was upheld, despite attempts by states, industries, and
labor unions to set it aside.31
The crux of the NOx SIP Call litigation was the rule's failure to
define "amounts which will contribute significantly to nonattain-
ment"32 solely on the grounds of downwind air quality impact from
upwind polluter states. Instead, the EPA "considered how much
NOx could be eliminated by sources in each [s]tate if those sources
28. Finding of Significant Contribution and Rulemaking for Certain States in the Ozone
Transport Assessment Group Region for Purposes of Reducing Regional Transport of Ozone,
63 Fed. Reg. 57, 356 (Oct. 27, 1998) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 72, 75, 96) [hereinafter
NO. SIP Call]. Each of the EPA regulations in regard to enforcement of the Good Neighbor
Provision deal with the collective contribution of nitrogen oxide ("NO.") and sulfur dioxide
("SO2"). The collective contribution of NO. and SO 2 emissions affect ozone and fine particle
("PM2 .5") pollution problems in the atmosphere. The effect of these emissions in the atmos-
phere is a complicated technical melting pot; however, the crux of it can be summarized gen-
erally. In regard to ozone pollution, emissions of NOx and volatile organic compounds
("VOCs"-an example of a VOC is something that has very low vapor pressure and changes
to the gaseous state very easily. A basic and common example of a VOC is gasoline) mix in
the atmosphere, in the presence of sunlight, to form ozone. VOCs, by their nature, can be
composed of tens of thousands of varying chemical combinations, some of which have low
reactivity with NO; as such the one common denominator and primary component for inter-
state ozone pollution is NOx. See Brief for Federal Petitioners, EME Homer City Generation
v. EPA, 696 F.3d 7 (D.C. Cir. 2013). As for PM 25 (which can be emitted directly or formed
secondarily once mixed with other emissions in the atmosphere), the primary interstate com-
ponent is attributable to sulfates formed by the emission of SO 2 from power plants, automo-
biles, and other combustion sources. Id. Both NO. and PM2 sprimary interstate components
travel across state borders and are the major contributors to downwind state's nonattain-
ment of the NAAQS.
Understanding the underlying chemical mechanisms is nothing short of complex, but the
purpose behind regulating these particular emissions is effervescently clear: short term ex-
posure to ozone in sufficient concentrations has proven to "irritate the respiratory system,"
aggravate asthma, and it has been associated with premature mortality. Brief for Federal
Petitioners, supra, at 5 n. 1. "Longer-term ozone exposure can inflame and damage the lining
of the lungs, which may lead to permanent changes in lung tissue and irreversible reductions
in lung function." Id. As for the negative public health and welfare effects of PM2.5, fine
particles "are associated with a number of serious health effects including premature mor-
tality, aggravation of respiratory and cardiovascular disease[,] ... lung disease .... asthma
attacks, and certain cardiovascular problems." Id. at 5 n.2.
29. See generally NO. SIP Call, supra note 29, at 57,356.
30. Nitrogen Oxide (NO ) Control Regulations, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/regionl/airquality/nox.html (last updated Sept. 13, 2013).
31. Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d 663, 695 (D.C. Cir. 2000). However, the court remanded
the case to the EPA on four minor issues. Id.
32. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D)(i)(I).
635
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installed 'highly cost-effective' emissions controls."33 The court held
that the EPA may consider differences in cutback costs, so that, af-
ter reduction of all that could be cost-effectively eliminated, any re-
maining "contribution" would not be considered "significant. '34 In
other words, the EPA can use cost considerations to lower an up-
wind state's obligation under the Good Neighbor Provision in addi-
tion to the amount of emissions that contribute to downwind non-
attainment.
In 2005, the EPA issued its second regulation, known as the
Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR).35 In a neoteric and more strin-
gent fashion, CAIR continued to address the interstate issue of NO.
as relating to ozone level pollution, but additionally regulated S02
emissions that contribute to nonattainment in downwind states of
the air quality standard for PM2.5.36 With the precedent established
in Michigan, CAIR employed two different formulas-both of which
incorporated cost considerations-to quantify each upwind state's
obligations in downwind abatement.37 At first glance, CAIR seemed
33. EME Homer City Generation v. EPA, 696 F.3d 7, 14 (D.C. Cir. 2012) cert. granted in
part, 133 S. Ct. 2857 (2013).
34. Michigan, 213 F.3d at 677-79. However, the Michigan court rejected the argument
that the Good Neighbor Provision forbids cost-considerations in regard to abatement of pol-
lution and found no "clear congressional intent to preclude consideration of cost." Id. at 677.
Judge Sentelle, in his dissent, agreed with the reading of the statutory text promulgated on
behalf of some of the states and representatives of the labor industry stating that the lan-
guage of the Good Neighbor Provision unambiguously "set forth one criterion [in determining
the amount of emissions reduction of an upwind state]: the emission of an amount of pollu-
tant [with no reference to cost considerations that is] sufficient to contribute significantly to
downwind nonattainment." Id. at 696 (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
35. Rule to Reduce Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter and Ozone (Clean Air
Interstate Rule), 70 Fed. Reg. 25,162 (May 12, 2005) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 72,
73, 74, 77, 78, 96) [hereinafter CAIR].
36. Id. at 25,171.
37. The epicenter of the litigation surrounding CAIR was the definition of the phrase
"contribute significantly" as used within the Good Neighbor Provision. North Carolina v.
EPA, 531 F.3d 896, 903 (D.C. Cir. 2008) [hereinafter North Carolina 1]. In CAIR, the EPA
took a region-wide emissions abatement approach. Id. at 904. North Carolina challenged
this region-wide approach on the premise that the "EPA did not purport to measure each
state's significant contribution to specific downwind nonattainment areas and eliminate [the
pollution] in an isolated, state-by-state manner[,]" but rather designed CAIR to eliminate
emissions contributions of upwind states as a whole. Id. at 907. According to North Carolina,
this design is in derogation of the requirements of the Good Neighbor Provision that each
state will abate its own significant contribution downwind. See id. at 921.
In response, the EPA argued that capped emissions in each state would be fruitless and
not cost-effective for the states. Id. The intricacies of how the EPA calculated the caps on
NO., S02, and PM2.5 are not relevant to this discussion; however, CAIR did employ an op-
tional cap and trade program that the states can opt in to (trading allowances with other
states or "banking" them for the future), and if not, then the state cannot exceed the cap set
by the EPA. Id. Because the EPA assumed states would opt in to the cap and trade program
because it is "highly cost effective," the EPA never measured the "significant contribution" in
regards to pollution emissions from sources within each state. Id. True, that this regional
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to rest on Michigan's precedential laurels, but in North Carolina v.
EPA, the court held that the formulas employed by CAIR exceeded
the EPA's statutory authority. 38 Expounding upon that holding, the
North Carolina I court stated that the Good Neighbor Provision
"gives [the] EPA no authority to force an upwind state to share the
burden of reducing other upwind states' emissions. Each state must
eliminate its own significant contribution to downwind pollution. '39
In critical language, the North Carolina I court underscored that
the EPA "may not require some states to exceed the mark."40 The
mechanics of CAIR that the EPA utilized to determine a state's "sig-
nificant contributions" on a cost-based region-wide basis, 41 though
premised upon notions of fairness, over-stepped the congressional
reduction method would yield the sum of the emission reductions required to improve nonat-
tainment downwind, but it "would never equal the aggregate of each state's significant con-
tribution . I..." -d.
38. The court explained that the EPA may use cost to "require termination of only a sub-
set of each state's contribution," but the "EPA cannot just pick a cost for a region, and deem
'significant' any emissions that sources can eliminate more cheaply." North Carolina I, 531
F.3d at 918. Ultimately in its decision, the North Carolina court recognized the precedent in
Michigan, giving the green light to the use of a cost-based approach to try to determine a
state's "significant contribution;" however, the court stated the following:
[T]he flow of logic only goes so far. It stops at the point where the EPA is no longer
effectuating its statutory mandate . . . CAIR must include some assurance that it
achieves something measurable towards the goal of prohibiting sources "within the
State" from contributing to nonattainment or interfering with maintenance in "any
other State."
Id. at 908.
39. Id. at 921 (emphasis added). Additionally, "PM2 .g" is defined as particulate matter.
Frequent Questions-Fine Particle (PM2.5) Designations, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/pmdesignations/faq.htm#O (last updated Feb. 6, 2014). These
particles are found in the air, including dust, dirt, soot, smoke, and liquid droplets. Id. Par-
ticle less than 2.5 micrometers in diameter (PM2 .5) are referred to as "fine" particles and are
believed to pose the greatest health risks. Id. To illustrate, PM2 5 is approximately 1/30 the
average width of a human hair-as such, fine particles can lodge deeply into the lungs. Id.
40. North Carolina I, 531 F.3d at 921. "Exceed[ing] the mark" is the buzz phrase imput-
ing a limitation on the EPA when promulgating rules to enforce the Good Neighbor Provision.
See id. A simple illustration can be used to explain this abstraction. State A, an upwind
state, has been deemed to "significantly contribute" NO. emissions to downwind nonattain-
ment site(s) at an amount (for simplicity purposes) of 25ppb (parts per billion). Similarly,
State B has also been deemed a "significant contributor" downwind but at a lower amount of
15ppb. If State B, while trying to abate only its significant contribution, is required to es-
sentially split the difference between itself and State A's significant contribution and abate
20ppb, State B has "exceeded the mark" and is now reducing portions of another upwind
state's "significant contributions." In simpler terms, "the mark" can best be described as a
ceiling; the EPA can require abatement of an upwind state's emissions but only to an amount
that does not exceed the ceiling. In the sophomoric example described, State A's ceiling is
25ppb and State B's ceiling is 15ppb; by making State B abate 20ppb, it has gone above its
ceiling and exceeded the mark.
41. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
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breadth of authority. 42 The EPA attempted to justify CAIR by ar-
guing that the region-wide cost effectiveness was "fair," however
the court disagreed and held that:
[The] EPA's redistributional instinct may be laudatory .... [the
Good Neighbor Provision] gives [the] EPA no authority to force
an upwind state to share the burden of reducing other wind
states' emissions. Each state must eliminate its own signifi-
cant contribution to downwind pollution. While CAIR should
achieve something measurable towards that goal, it may not
require some states to exceed the mark.43
In effect, North Carolina I establishes a caveat to Michigan's ap-
proval of cost considerations: the Good Neighbor Provision allows
the EPA to use cost to lower an upwind state's obligations44 but not
to increase an upwind state's obligations or to force a state to "ex-
ceed the mark. '' 45 As such, holding true to precedent, this interpre-
tation must be present in future rules. 46
C. The Transport Rule
The EPA promulgated the Transport Rule in response to the
North Carolina II court's holding mandating that the EPA furnish
a rule "consistent with [its prior] opinion" in North Carolina L 47
The Transport Rule is an attempt to quantify a state's Good Neigh-
bor Provision obligations in regard to three NAAQS: the 1997 an-
nual PM2.5 NAAQS; the 1997 ozone NAAQS; and the 2006 24-hour
PM2.5 NAAQS. 48
The Transport Rule is bifurcated into phases. The purpose of the
first phase is to determine what states are subject to the Transport
Rule and then define the amounts that each state is to abate its
emissions downwind pursuant to the Good Neighbor Provision. The
42. North Carolina I, 531 F.3d at 919.
43. Id. at 921.
44. See Michigan, 213 F.3d at 679.
45. North Carolina , 531 F.3d at 921. The court emphasized the plain language of the
statute to capitulate congressional intent. Id. at 910. In analyzing CAIR, the court kept the
congressional intent of the Good Neighbor Provision in mind: "[A]ccording to Congress, indi-
vidual state contributions to downwind nonattainment areas do matter. [The Good Neighbor
Provision] prohibits sources "within a state" from "contribut[ing] significantly to nonattain-
ment in... any other State .... Id. at 907 (emphasis added). Showing, according to the
court, that region-wide abatement forces states to "share the burden." Id. at 921.
46. The North Carolina court remanded CAIR without vacatur, leaving it in place "until
it is replaced by a rule consistent with our opinion." North Carolina u. EPA, 550 F.3d 1176,
1178 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (on rehearing) [hereinafter North Carolina I1].
47. North Carolina II, 550 F.3d at 1178.
48. See Transport Rule, supra note 10.
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purpose of the second phase, which only applies to states that are
subject to the Transport Rule, is to prescribe "Federal Implementa-
tion Plans" to implement obligations at the state level. 49
In phase one, the EPA appraised the amount that each state was
to abate its emissions based upon "amounts which will 'contribute
significantly' to nonattainment in, or interfere with maintenance"
of the three NAAQS in other downwind states 0.5 This initial "quan-
tifying" phase of the Transport Rule is broken down further into two
subordinate steps. In the first sub-step, the EPA decided which
states are "contributing significantly" based upon "linkages" be-
tween each upwind state and specific downwind nonattainment ar-
eas.51 This first step was designed to determine which states were
actually subject to the Transport Rule.
In this first sub-step, the EPA instituted a threshold requirement
to determine whether an upwind state is "linked" to a downwind
state's "nonattainment" or "maintenance" areas. 52 The EPA set the
threshold amount equivalent to one percent of the relevant
NAAQS. 53 If EPA modeling showed that an upwind state exceeded
the one percent air quality threshold limit (of NOx and PM2.5), then
there was a viable linkage between the upwind state and the down-
wind state-meaning that the upwind state is a "significant con-
tributor" and subject to the Transport Rule.54
Next, in the second sub-step within the first "quantifying" phase,
the EPA determined the "amount" of emissions that the "significant
contribut[ing]" states were to reduce. In this step, the "EPA deter-
mined how much pollution each upwind State's power plants could
eliminate if the upwind State's plants applied all emission controls
available at or below a given cost per ton of pollution reduced. '55
49. EME Homer City Generation v. EPA, 696 F.3d 7, 15 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
50. North Carolina 1, 531 F.3d at 908 (emphasis in original).
51. Transport Rule, supra note 10, at 48,236. The Good Neighbor Provision does not
limit state emission abatement to those that only "contribute significantly" to nonattainment
in downwind states, but it also requires emission reductions from such states that interfere
with "maintenance" of a site's attainment of the NAAQS. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D)(i)(J). This
statutory text includes abatement on behalf of upwind states whose emission affect specific
"maintenance" areas that, absent regulation, would not be able to "maintain" the NAAQS.
Transport Rule, supra note 10, at 48,236.
52. Transport Rule, supra note 10, at 48,236.
53. Id. That is, the threshold for the relevant NAAQS were: 0.8 ppb for ozone,
0.015pg/m 3 for annual PM2.5, and 0.35 pg/m
3 for 24-hour PM2.5. Id.
54. In other words, if an upwind state sent any amount greater than these threshold
limits to a downwind state, there was a linkage between the two states, and consequently
the upwind state was deemed a significant contributor. It necessarily follows than any state
that emitted less than these threshold amounts to downwind states were not deemed a "sig-
nificant contributor" and did not have to reduce its emissions for purposes of compliance with
the Good Neighbor Provision.
55. EME Homer City Generation, 696 F.3d at16-17.
639
640 Duquesne Law Review Vol. 53
The caveat, however, is that these "cost per ton levels" were applied
without regard to the findings in step one; that is, they were applied
without any reference to the amount each state "significantly con-
tributed" to downwind nonattainment or maintenance areas, thus
totally abandoning air quality thresholds in lieu of a cost-based
standard. 56 The significance of this approach is that the amount of
pollution that the EPA required a state to reduce its emissions by,
in effect, was not tied to the amount of air pollution that is trans-
ported downwind to nonattainment areas. 57
After this initial "quantifying" phase, the EPA then moved onto
the second phase of the Transport Rule. With the amounts now
configured as to which state is a "significant contributor," and
therefore the amount each state is required to abate, the EPA did
not shift authority to the states to create implementation plans. 58
Instead, the EPA simultaneously implemented federal plans that
usurped the state's power and mandated abatement as defined by
56. Id. at 17.
57. Id. at 16-17. During this second sub-step within the "quantifying phase," the EPA
used these cost-levels to gauge how much power plants' emissions would fall if power plants
within a state were obligated to install controls at least at the cost-level, measured by a cost
per ton of the pollutant reduced. Id. at 17. For example, in order to set the cost-threshold,
if a certain control mechanism eliminated four tons of emissions and cost $2,000 dollars to
install, the price to the power plant to install this emission control would be $500/ton. Using
the EPA's methodology, with this $500/ton cost-threshold as a capped ceiling, the EPA then
used modeling to predict how much emissions could be eliminated, started at the bottom at
$1/ton and analyzing sequentially for each dollar amount up to the $500/ton cap. The EPA
then added these numbers together with other states' numbers to render a region-wide total
for the amount that each pollutant can be reduced by the region at each cost-threshold from
$1/ton to $500/ton. See Transport Rule, supra note 10, at 48,250-53. Logically, the higher
the cost-level for installing emission controls that the EPA could select as its cost-level
threshold, the higher the amount of emissions that could be reduced; however, with that
naturally follows the profound burden on the power plants within the industry as well as the
states themselves to install exorbitant emissions controls.
In the same stroke, the EPA looked at these cost-controls from the vantage point of the
downwind states. See EME Homer City Generation, 696 F.3d at 17. The EPA used modeling
to quantify how much the air quality in a downwind state would improve based upon the
various cost-level emissions reductions that were predicted previously. Transport Rule, su-
pra note 10, at 48,253.
With cost-level analyses from the opposite perspectives of both upwind states and down-
wind states, the EPA was fully equipped to make a decision and choose a region-wide cost-
level threshold for each of the three pollutants relevant to Transport Rule regulation. Con-
sequently, the EPA decided on a $500/ton threshold for annual NO and ozone-season NO.
for every state. Id. at 48,256-57. For S02, rather than employing a universal cost-threshold,
the EPA divided the upwind states into two groups with two different cost-thresholds: Seven
upwind states were subjected to a cost-threshold of $500/ton, and sixteen states, where the
$500/ton threshold would be ineffective, were subject to a harsh $2,300/ton cost-threshold.
EME Homer City Generation, 696 F.3d at 17-18.
58. Title I of the CAA gives the states "the primary responsibility for assuring air quality"
within their respective sovereignties. 42 U.S.C. § 7407(a).
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the EPA, giving the states a secondary role. 59 These federal plans
"remain fully in place in each covered state until a state's [plan] is
submitted and approved by [the] EPA to revise or replace a [federal
plan] .,6o
D. Present Debate and the United States Supreme Court's
Resolution
"An array of power companies, coal companies, labor unions,
trade associations, states, and local governments petitioned for re-
view of [the] EPA's Transport Rule. '6 1 The gravamen of this collec-
tive protesting was that the EPA exceeded its statutory authority
under the Good Neighbor Provision in enacting the Transport
Rule.6 2 Specifically, the petitioners argued that the EPA ran afoul
of its statutory authority in a blatant disregard for the language of
the Good Neighbor Provision by: (1) issuing federal plans prema-
turely, without allowing the states to first submit plans;6 3 (2) regu-
lating emissions on a region-wide basis in contravention of the hold-
ing in North Carolina I that required a state's proportional
abatement; and (3) using cost-only considerations to determine
whether a state was a significant contributor.6 4 The EPA argued
that the Transport Rule and its policy decisions are sound and an-
chored to its authority within the CAA. Accordingly, the EPA as-
serted that its regulation should be given the deference usually
given to expert administrative agencies involving highly complex
issues.
In EME Homer City Generation, the D.C. Circuit Court agreed
with the labor industry and state petitioners and held that the EPA
exceeded its statutory authority under the Good Neighbor Provision
59. "States have the option of submitting [state plans] that modify some elements of the
[federal plans]." EME Homer City Generation, 696 F.3d at 18. State's can submit plans in
the hopes of replacing the federal plans in their entirety, but this is contingent upon EPA
approval. Id.
60. Transport Rule, supra note 10, at 48,328.
61. EME Homer City Generation, 696 F.3d at 19.
62. North Carolina , 531 F.3d at 919.
63. EME Homer City Generation, 696 F.3d at 11-12. Rooted within the statutory lan-
guage, the CAA is devised to adhere to a cooperative federalism approach. See 42 U.S.C. §
7402. When Congress delegated its rulemaking authority to the EPA, it ultimately allowed
the EPA to set air-quality standards (i.e., the NAAQS); however, the power then shifts to the
states to determine how to successfully meet those standards. See id. The "EPA determines
the ends ... but Congress has given the states the initiative and a broad responsibility re-
garding those means to achieve those ends .... The [CAA] is an experiment in federalism,
and the EPA may not run roughshod over the procedural prerogatives that the Act has re-
served the states .... " Virginia v. EPA, 108 F.3d 1397, 1408 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
64. Final Reply Brief for Industry and Labor Petitioners, EME Homer City Generation
v. EPA, 696 F.3d 7 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
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of the CAA in implementing the Transport Rule and that the EPA
could not issue federal plans without giving states an initial oppor-
tunity to implement the required reductions through state plans.6 5
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine
the ultimate legal questions: (1) whether the court of appeals cor-
rectly interpreted the statutory language in the Clean Air Act; and
(2) whether an upwind state is free from obligations under the
Transport Rule until the EPA has quantified the state's contribu-
tion to downwind states' air pollution?66 On April 29, 2014, the
Court rendered final decisions on these issues by applying Chevron
deference.6 7
As to the first issue, the Court held that the Court of Appeals did
not correctly interpret the statutory language of the CAA and vis-
A-vis that misinterpretation, the EPA's cost-effective allocation of
emission reductions among upwind states is a permissible, worka-
ble, and an equitable interpretation of the Good Neighbor Provi-
sion.68 In support of its holding, the Court described in unambigu-
ous terms how it accords agency discretion, stating "[t]his Court
routinely accords dispositive effect to an agency's reasonable inter-
pretation of ambiguous statutory language."6 9 The Court noted that
the Good Neighbor Provision delegates authority to the EPA to re-
duce upwind pollution only to those "amounts" of pollution that
"contribute significantly to nonattainment" in downwind states]0
Further, the Court noted that because a downwind state's excess
pollution is often caused by multiple upwind states, the EPA had to
address how to allocate responsibility among multiple contribu-
tors.7 1 In establishing the EPA's interpretation of the statute as
laudatory, the Court stated that the Good Neighbor Provision does
not dictate an apportionment method, and as such, nothing in the
provision directs the proportional allocation method advanced by
the D. C. Circuit Court.7 2 According to the Court, Congress' silence
effectively delegates authority to the EPA to select from reasonable
options.7 3 Based upon the Courts analysis, the EPA was tasked
with choosing which equal "amounts" to eliminate, and the EPA's
65. Id. at 37-38.
66. See EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, 133 S. Ct. 2857 (2013).
67. EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, 134 S. Ct. 1584, 1603 (2014); Chevron U.S.A.
Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
68. Id. at 1589.
69. Id. (emphasis added).
70. Id.; see also §7410(a)(2)(D)(i).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229(2001)).
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choice to reduce the amount that was easier, i.e., less costly to erad-
icate, 74 was a permissible statutory interpretation. 75
In regard to the second issue, whether an upwind state is free
from obligations under the Transport Rule until the EPA has quan-
tified the state's Good Neighbor obligations, the Court held "[t]he
CAA's plain text supports the [EPA]: Disapproval of a [state plan],
without more, triggers EPA's obligation to issue a [federal plan] ."76
In support of its holding the Court summarized that the statute sets
forth deadlines for both the states and the EPA, 77 and in an effort
to reinforce its rationale in overturning the D.C. Circuit Courts's
holding of the same issue, the Court stated, "[h]owever sensible the
D.C. Circuit's exception to this strict time prescription may be, a
reviewing court's task is to apply the text [of the statute], not to
improve upon it."78 The Court held that the CAA does not condition
the duty for the EPA to promulgate a federal plan on its having first
quantified an upwind state's Good Neighbor obligations.79  Accord-
ing to the Court, "[b]y altering Congress' [state plan] and [federal
plan] schedule, the D.C. Circuit allowed a delay Congress did not
order and placed an information submission obligation on [the] EPA
Congress did not impose."80
Based upon the Court's analysis and holdings, it refused to inval-
idate the entire Transport Rule.81 However, the Court's holdings
are not grounded upon approbative precedent or interpretation; ra-
ther, the holdings are a natural by-product of an extreme, if not
willfully blind, deference to agency interpretation. As such,
through its deference to agency interpretation and rule making, the
74. Id.
75. Id. In support the Court noted that nothing in the Good Neighbor Provision expressly
foreclosed the possibility of using cost as a variable for eradication of ambient air particles.
The Court further rationalized that the EPA's interpretation was reasonable because it was
"efficient" and "equitable" in stating, "[it is] [elfficient because the EPA can achieve the same
levels of attainment, i.e., of emission reductions, the proportional approach aims to achieve,
but at a much lower overall cost. Equitable because, by imposing uniform cost thresholds on
regulated States, the EPA's rule subjects to stricter regulation those States that have done
less in the past to control their pollution." Id.
76. Id. at 1588.
77. Id. at 1600. The Court articulates these respective obligations as follows:
Once EPA issues any new or revised NAAQS, a State "shall" propose a state plan
within three years, 42 U.S.C. §7410(a)(1), and that state plan "shall" include, inter
alia, provisions adequate to satisfy the Good Neighbor Provision, §7410(a)(2). If the
EPA finds a state plan inadequate, the Agency has a statutory duty to issue a federal
plan "at any time" within two years.
Id. at 1588.
78. Id. (internal quotation omitted).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1589.
81. Id. at 1590.
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Court approved the undemocratic revision of the CAA, and funda-
mentally erred in reaching its holdings.8 2
11. ANALYSIS
A. Applicable Rules of Law-Deference Regimes
The Great Depression placed enormous pressure on the govern-
ment to respond to economic disrepair. Within 100 days of taking
office, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt was successful in pass-
ing a number of regulatory laws and creating many administrative
agencies, armed with purported expertise, to heal the wounded
economy. But, in a series of cases, the United States Supreme
Court struck down most of this New Deal legislation, holding that
it was beyond Congress's power. The reaction to the Court's deci-
sions in these cases was intense. President Roosevelt proposed his
infamous "court-packing" plan, designed to place justices on the
bench who would support the government's ability to regulate eco-
nomic activity.83 Although President Roosevelt's court-packing
plan failed, the firestorm in the face of this attempted hostile take-
over forced the Court to eventually change its position on these is-
sues. This change yielded a new and highly deferential standard in
favor of the legislature. However, what precise deference to accord
an agency has been developed over time through a litany of cases
addressing the issue.
When Congress delegates its power to an administrative agency,
it is axiomatic that that agency only act-that is, regulate-within
the power that is given to them statutorily from Congress.8 4 If an
agency exceeds its authority in promulgating a regulation, the reg-
ulation is unenforceable; however, the high deference accorded to
agency action makes invalidation difficult to render.8 5
82. See id. at 1610 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
83. See generally William E. Leuchtenburg, FDR's Court-Packing Plan: A Second Life, A
Second Death, 1985 DUKE L.J. 673 (1985) (explaining the background, motives, scheme, and
impact on government posterity of President Roosevelt's court-packing plan).
84. Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988). To be sure, administra-
tive agencies can also rule-make, as opposed to strictly promulgating regulations to effectu-
ate Congress-created laws, provided that this authority is statutorily deferred to the agency.
85. Challenging an administrative agency regulation on the basis that the agency acted
outside of its statutory authority is not the only way a challenge may be brought; however,
alternative challenges are outside the scope of this paper.
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Case law reveals what appears to be a continuum of deference
regimes accorded to administrative agencies' interpretation of stat-
utes, regulations, or rule-makings.86 The first regime is Curtiss-
Wright8 7 deference. It affords a tenacious deference to executive in-
terpretations concerning foreign affairs and issues of national secu-
rity. The Seminole Rock88 regime provides a strong deference to
agency interpretations of the agency's own regulations. Chevron8 9
deference involves a notorious two-prong analysis centered around
whether agency interpretation of a statute is reasonable, contingent
upon the requirement that the statute has not clearly addressed the
issue at bar. Beth Israel9° deference, a Pre-Chevron analysis, allows
reasonable agency interpretations so long as they are consistent
with the statute it purports to modify. Skidmore91 deference gives
agency interpretations respect proportional to its power to per-
suade. The next regime employed, though not expressly acknowl-
edged, by the Court is Consultative Deference. It relies on the
agency in some form to guide its reasoning. The last regime, Anti-
Deference, involves a presumption against agency interpretation. 92
These pre-Chevron deference regimes are proper to explain the evo-
lution of of deference accorded to administrative agencies; however,
in analyzing the Transport Rule, the Court did not rely on these
regimes and as such, discussion of them is outside the scope of this
paper. 93
86. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Defer-
ence: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to
Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083 (2008).
87. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936); Eskridge & Baer,
supra note 86, at 1098.
88. Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945); Eskridge & Baer, supra
note 86, at 1098.
89. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 837; Eskridge & Baer, supra note 86, at 1098.
90. Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483 (1978); Eskridge & Baer, supra note 86, at
1098.
91. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944); Eskridge & Baer, supra note 86, at
1098.
92. Eskridge & Baer, supra note 86, at 1098.
93. To be sure, the Court did not rely on them because many of these pre-Chevron re-
gimes, though not expressly overruled, are applicable only to limited controversies. Logi-
cally, Curtiss-Wright deference is not appropriate to the present issue because the EPA's
quantification of the Good Neighbor Provision of the CAA is not a matter of foreign policy or
national security. Id. at 1098-101. Seminole Rock deference is not appropriate because the
EPA is not interpreting its own regulation but rather, what is at issue is the EPA's interpre-
tation of a provision within the CAA. Id. Finally, the Beth Israel test is also not appropriate.
Id. Though the analogous nature between the Beth Israel and Chevron tests is glaring, sta-
tistical trends show that the Beth Israel test, which had its genesis before Chevron, survived
Chevron and is primarily used in cases concerning labor law, immigration, treaty interpre-
tation, sentencing, education, and regulated industries. Id. at 1107-08.
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In Skidmore v. Swift, the Court held that agency interpretations
were merely persuasive, not controlling, and that courts should look
to factors, including the validity and consistency of the agency's rea-
soning when deciding if the agency deserved deference. 94 After
Skidmore, the Court developed another deference regime. Chevron
expounded a new standard for judicial deference to administrative
agencies.9 5 The Chevron two prong-test is as follows: (1) Congress
has directly spoken to the precise question at issue, and if the intent
of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; and (2) "If ... the
court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise
question at issue" because "the statute is silent or ambiguous with
respect to the specific issue," the court must determine whether the
agency's interpretation of the statute is reasonable.96 In a shift from
Skidmore,97 the Chevron Court recognized that an inherent part of
interpreting an ambiguous statute is making policy decisions, and
the agencies, in their official expert capacities, are best equipped to
make these policy decisions. 98  The Chevron rule gives agencies
more deference and, through that deference, more freedom to inter-
pret rules; however, Chevron is not a carte blanche for agencies to
rule with unfettered discretion. Courts still retain a narrow author-
ity to strike down a regulation if it is unreasonable-quantified as
whether it is "arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the
statute."99
To scholars, lawyers, and law school students, Chevron seems to
be the alpha and the omega regarding the applicable law of admin-
istrative agency deference. Undoubtedly notorious and fundamen-
tally reinforced by subsequent case law, there has, however, been a
growing view that Chevron allows administrative agencies to press
for more aggressive statutory interpretations-acting fast and loose
with confidence that courts will invoke the Chevron test and ap-
prove agency actions as a matter of course. 100
94. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
95. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 837.
96. Id. at 842-44 (emphasis added).
97. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 134. Skidmore gave the courts significant discretion in deter-
mining factors that gave the agency power to persuade and hence, getting deference. See
generally id.
98. 467 U.S. at 843.
99. Id. at 844.
100. See Elliot, supra note 7, at 11-12. Donald Elliott, former General Counsel of the
EPA, asserts that Chevron allowed the EPA to be more aggressive in pursuing a policy-ori-
ented approach to environmental statutes (at the expense of a legalistic approach) with some
confidence that the D.C. Circuit would go along with the agency's interpretations. Id.
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However, even after a careful reading of Chevron, the question
still remained as to whether Chevron eliminated and replaced pre-
vious deference regimes like Skidmore. In United States v. Mead
Corp., this question was finally answered. The Court retained
Skidmore's vintage and pronounced its deference regime as good
law. 10 1 Furthermore, the Mead Court limited Chevron deference to
those instances when a court unequivocally finds that: (1) Congress
implicitly delegated to the agency primary interpretive power; and
(2) the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated
in the exercise of that authority. 1 2 Mead held that when Congress
has not delegated lawmaking authority to an agency, Skidmore def-
erence governs.10 3 As such, Mead purports to draw a bright line
rule delineating when to apply Skidmore or Chevron.
When Congress delegated power to the EPA, it implicitly dele-
gated primary interpretive power, and the EPA exercised such
power through regulation promulgation, including NOx SIP Call,
CAIR, and the Transport Rule.10 4 Thus, the EPA has met the two-
part threshold requirement created in Mead, triggering the
Transport Rule to be subject to Chevron deference analysis.10 5
B. Cost-Considerations to Define "Contribute Significantly"
Analyzed within the Context of Chevron Deference
The EPA's interpretation of the phrase "contribute significantly"
within the Good Neighbor Provision can only be grounded upon an
ambiguous reading of the statute. However, the statute is not am-
biguous, and therefore the Court should not have given Chevron
deference to the EPA's interpretation.
Justice Stevens, writing for the Court in Chevron, established the
Chevron deference rule. The Court explained,
When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute
which it administers, it is confronted with two questions. First,
always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken
to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is
clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the
agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent
101. 533 U.S. 218, 238 (2001). To the contrary, Justice Scalia has pronounced the Skid-
more test obsolete post-Chevron. Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 589 (2000)
(Scalia, J., concurring). However, the statistics show the Skidmore test is alive and well.
Eskridge & Baer, supra note 86, at 1109.
102. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 226-27.
103. Id. at 237.
104. See supra notes 10, 29, and 36.
105. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 226-27.
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of Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has
not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court
does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as
would be necessary in the absence of an administrative inter-
pretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with re-
spect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether
the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of
the statute.106
Thus, if a court finds that Congress has directly spoken to its
statutory intent, the inquiry ends there and any regulation must
effectuate Congress's express intent. In regard to the first prong,
the Court has stated that the traditional tools of statutory construc-
tion are available. 1°7
With respect to the second prong-the reasonableness of the
EPA's interpretation-"[w]hen the legislative prescription is not
free from ambiguity, the administrator must choose between con-
flicting reasonable interpretations." 108 Courts have continually
found the agency's interpretation is reasonable where it is con-
sistent with any of the following: (1) the statute's plain language or
meaning;10 9 (2) congressional intent and underlying purpose of the
statute;110 or (3) agency expertise in administering a technical reg-
ulatory scheme.1
The EPA centered its arguments on the view that the Good
Neighbor Provision is ambiguous, and therefore, allowed it to make
a reasonable interpretation of the statute.11 2 Specifically, when the
EPA included a cost-based analysis in its calculations of what
makes an upwind state a significant contributor, it premised this
inclusion on the statute's "ambiguous and undefined terms."11 3 In-
deed, the EPA is correct; the statute is silent as to prescribing how
106. Chevron 467 U.S. at 842-43.
107. Id. at 843 n.9. "If a court, employing traditional tools of statutory construction, as-
certains that Congress has an intention on the precise question at issue, that intention is the
law and must be given effect." Id.
108. Holly Farms Corp. v. NLRB, 517 U.S. 392, 398-99 (1996).
109. See Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Me. Corp., 503 U.S. 407 (1992).
110. See Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81 (2002) (striking down a La-
bor Department regulation imposing a penalty on employers because the penalty was against
Congress's intent in enacting the controlling legislation).
111. See Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361
(1986). Agency expertise in administering a complicated regulatory scheme is, however, ir-
relevant as to whether the interpretation is in derogation of the plain language of the statute
as "[n]o amount of agency expertise-however sound may be the result-[could support an
agency interpretation inconsistent with the statutory language]." Id. at 368.
112. See Brief for Federal Petitioners, supra note 28, at 45.
113. Id.
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to quantify a state as a significant contributor. In furtherance of
this observation, the EPA necessarily extended its argument to al-
low it to take into account cost-based analyses into the "significant
contributor" determination because the statute does not expressly
compel a "strict air quality-only methodological approach. 1 14  In
other words, the EPA argued that "significant," as it is used for the
purposes of "significantly contribute," can mean different things
and that "significantly" is not limited to an emissions-only valua-
tion.
However, fragments of a statute must not be read in a vacuum.
The EPA "makes a fundamental mistake by divorcing the adverb
'significantly' from the verb it modifies, 'contribute,"' and continues
to "compoun[d] their error by divorcing significantly from the rest
of the statutory provision.11 5 The Good Neighbor Provision re-
quires each state to prohibit only those "amounts" of ambient pollu-
tant particles emitted within a state that "contribute significantly"
to another state's nonattainment.116 Stated differently, the statute
addresses solely the environmental consequences of emissions, not
the facility of reducing them; and it requires states to shoulder bur-
dens in proportion to the size of their contributions, not in propor-
tion to the ease of bearing them.11 7 "[C]ourts must presume that a
legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute
what it says there.' 'l8 Thus, the EPA cannot read broader author-
ity into a statute in contravention of its text.1 1 9
114. Id. at 46.
115. Michigan, 213 F.3d at 696 (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
116. State implementation plans must contain adequate provisions "prohibiting... emis-
sions activity within the state from emitting any air pollutant in amounts which will ... con-
tribute significantly to nonattainment in, or interfere with maintenance by, any other State
with respect to [the NAAQS]." 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410(a)(2)(D)(i), (I) (emphasis added).
117. EPA v, Homer City Generation, 134 S.Ct. 1584, 1611 (2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(emphasis in original).
118. Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 461-62 (2002).
119. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D)(i)() (plain language of the statute requires
abating state's respective "significant shares" downwind). Perhaps the solution is an amend-
ment to the CAA. As the statute is written, each state is responsible for its proportional
share that significantly contributes to downwind nonattainment in other states. Id. What
the EPA is trying to do is to regionalize a national problem. Though a seemingly great solu-
tion to an immensely difficult complication, the only issue is the lack of statutory authority
for a program that "shares the burden" within the Good Neighbor Provision. Taking cue from
the very successful Acid Rain Program, a cap and trade system could create an industrial
emissions trading market, while meeting the NAAQS, without having each state restricted
to only abating their proportionate share. See Acid Rain Program, U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/progsregs/arp/basic.html (last updated July 25,
2012). During oral argument Justice Scalia stated that a statute that could provide for such
a regulation could potentially be the answer to the problem at hand and act as a better stat-
ute than the one currently in place. Oral Argument at [13:30], EME Homer City Generation
v. EPA, 696 F.3d 7 (D.C. Cir. 2012), http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2013/2013 12 1182
[hereinafter Oral Argument]. However, Congress failed in 2003 and 2004 to enact the Bush
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This proposition finds support in a United States Supreme Court
decision that confronted a similar issue. In Whitman v. American
Trucking Ass'n, the Court held that the EPA may not consider costs
in setting the NAAQS. 120 The Court underscored that other provi-
sions within the CAA "explicitly permitted or required economic
costs to be taken into account in implementing the air quality
standards" and thus, the Court "refused to find implicit in ambigu-
ous sections of the CAA an authorization to consider costs that has
elsewhere, and so often, been expressly granted."121 The Whitman
Court concluded that absent a "textual commitment of authority to
the EPA to consider costs in setting NAAQS," the text of the statute,
interpreted in its historical context, "unambiguously bars cost con-
sideration from the NAAQS-setting process, and thus ends the mat-
ter for [the Court] as well as the EPA. '1 22
In extending this holding to its logical conclusion, the EPA must
accordingly "show a textual commitment of authority to [the] EPA
to consider costs" in defining "contribute significantly" under the
Good Neighbor Provision.1 23 The EPA cannot meet this burden be-
cause the Good Neighbor Provision is resoundingly silent as to any
mention of allowing cost-considerations to define "contribute signif-
icantly."1 24 It necessarily follows that had Congress intended the
EPA to have authority to consider costs, it would have expressly
allocated that authority-as it has done in various other provisions
Administration's Clear Skies initiative designed to reduce air pollution via a nationwide trad-
ing system. See Elliott, supra note 7, at 3. Instead, the EPA has proposed rules to implement
pollution trading systems, as seen by the Transport Rule, over most of the country under
existing law. Id. "Before Chevron, [the] EPA would not even imagine that it possessed the
authority to work such fundamental reforms into a major statutory scheme without the ben-
efit of statutory amendment." Id. As such, this brazen attitude that the EPA post-Chevron
has grown to be one of the landmark holding's greatest criticisms; making policy-based deci-
sions notwithstanding legal oversight. Id.
120. 531 U.S. 457, 471 (2001).
121. Id. at 467.
122. Id. at 468, 471.
123. Id. at 468 (clarifying that "that textual commitment must be a clear one. Con-
gress .. .does not alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or
ancillary provisions-it does not, one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes.").
124. Michigan, 213 F.3d at 679. In Michigan, the court found no "clear congressional
intent to preclude consideration of cost." Id. at 678-79. However, in Michigan, cost-controls
were allowed to be "considered" in determining whether a state was a significant contributor.
Id. at 679. That is, cost can be considered not as the only factor, but rather in addition to or
as a conduit to emission levels. In the Transport Rule, the EPA totally abandons any
consideration of emission levels after a state has met the one percent threshold subjecting it
to the Transport Rule. See EME Homer City Generation, 696 F.3d at 17. It is the next stage
that distinguishes the Michigan case from the one at bar: after the threshold has been met,
the EPA then only considered costs as to whether a state contributes significantly. See supra
text accompanying note 58. This is a direct aspersion to the statutory language because it
fails to take into account the "amounts" that contribute signficantly to downwind
nonattainment and is not consistent with the holding in Michigan. See supra note 33.
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of the CAA.125 As a maxim of statutory construction, "[w]here Con-
gress includes particular language in one section of a statute but
omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed
that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate in-
clusion or exclusion. '126
In its defense, the EPA ignored the aforementioned string of prec-
edent and relied upon a self-serving case that would permit it to
consider costs except where "unambiguously precluded by stat-
ute. 1 27 However, the Entergy case interpreted a provision of the
Clean Water Act;1 28 an Act whose language is facially distinguisha-
ble from that of the CAA.1 29 The Clean Water Act's equivalent
standard to the CAA's "contribute significantly" standard is the
phrase "best technology available."1 30 "Best technology available"
is easily interpreted as encompassing cost-considerations, and the
Court made mention of such an appropriate interpretation. 131 An-
other significant contrast from the CAA is that the Clean Water Act
was "silent not only with respect to cost-benefit analysis but with
respect to all potentially relevant factors.1' 32 Conversely, the CAA
is not silent, but rather mentions the relevant factor; the "amounts"
of pollution from upwind states. This is the factor to be considered
when determining whether a state contributes significantly.1 33
The EPA made a critical error in comparing the Clean Water Act
to that of the distinguishable language of the CAA and thereby un-
fortunately compared apples to oranges. Furthermore, the EPA
premised its interpretation of the Good Neighbor Provision on ex-
trapolating isolated phrases in order to yield its desired results.
However, an interpretation that is created from a patchwork of ex-
cised phrases overlooks context and is fundamentally unsound.
Based upon the foregoing, the Good Neighbor Provision is not am-
biguous, thus the EPA's argument that is entirely contingent upon
the statute being ambiguous, implodes. Basic schema of statutory
interpretation shows that the Good Neighbor Provision is not am-
biguous, because the provision indeed was designed to address the
physical effects of physical causes, and it is only the magnitude of
125. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 7404(a)(1), 7511b(d), 7628(a)(1)(A), 7651c(f0(1)(A).
126. Sebelius v. Cloer, 133 S. Ct. 1886, 1894 (2013) (citing Bates v. United States, 522
U.S. 23, 29-30 (1997)).
127. Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 219-20 (2009).
128. See generally id.
129. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1972).
130. 33 U.S.C. § 1326(b).
131. Entergy Corp., 566 U.S. at 218.
132. Id. at 222 ("If silence here implies prohibition, then the EPA could not consider any
factors in implementing [the statute]-an obvious logical impossibility.").
133. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D)(i)(I).
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the relationship sufficient to trigger regulation that admits of some
vagueness. In other words, the statute is ambiguous insofar as how
much of a contribution to downwind pollution is "significant," but it
is not at all ambiguous regarding factors unrelated to the amount
of pollutants that make up a contribution affecting the analysis. 134
To be sure, the EPA ignores the plain language of the statute and
thereby sacrifices democratically adopted text to bureaucratically
favored policy. An interpretation that is in direct derogation of the
plain text of the statute is not reasonable, and the Court erred in
concluding the opposite. Therefore, the EPA's interpretation as it
pertains to its quantification of "significantly contribute" within the
Good Neighbor Provision should not have been given Chevron def-
erence.
C. Cooperative Federalism Analyzed within the Context of
Chevron Deference
When the EPA promulgated federal implementation plans on the
same day as implementing the Transport Rule, it failed to give the
states the first attempt to attain air quality standards. This is an-
other reason why the Court erred in giving the EPA deference, as it
failed to adhere to the cooperative federalism dynamic of the CAA.
A major component of the CAA is its call to the states to imple-
ment their own state-initiated plans on how they will comply with
EPA regulations. 135 In essence, this federal agency, a creature of
statute, has left a gap to be filled by the states. This "gap" typifies
a concept that is recognized as cooperative federalism.1 36 Preserv-
ing this cooperative federalism dynamic is pivotal to the CAA.
When this dynamic is skewed and federal power usurps the prov-
ince of the states, this depreciates the original congressional intent
of the CAA that "air pollution prevention ... and air pollution con-
trol at its source is the primary responsibility of the States and local
governments. 1 37 Instead of adhering to this province, the EPA took
this fundamental power from the states.1 38 Moreover, the states
never had an opportunity to comply with the Transport Rule before
the EPA implemented federal plans. As such, it is hard-pressed to
find any reasonable ground that justifies frustrating an indispen-
sable province of the CAA-cooperative federalism.
134. EPA v. Homer City Generation, 134 S. Ct. 1584, 1611 (2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
135. 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(3) (2010).
136. See Connecticut v. EPA, 696 F.2d 147, 151 (2d Cir. 1982).
137. 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(3) (emphasis added).
138. Brief for State and Local Respondents, EME Homer City Generation v. EPA, 696
F.3d 7 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
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In Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the Court
was presented with the question "whether Congress intended the
States to retain any significant degree of control of the manner in
which they attain and maintain [the NAAQS], at least once their
initial plans have been approved. ' 139 The Court held that the stat-
ute "plainly" consigns the EPA to a "secondary role in the process of
determining and enforcing the specific, source-by-source emission
limitations which are necessary if the [NAAQS] it has set are to be
met."140 The EPA cannot inquire into the wisdom of a state's plan;
"so long as the ultimate effect of a [s]tate's choice of emission limi-
tations is compliance with [the NAAQS] for ambient air, the State
is at liberty to adopt whatever mix of emission limitations it deems
best suited to its particular situation."1 41
Thus, "[t]he [CAA] is an experiment in federalism, and the EPA
may not run roughshod over the procedural prerogatives that the
[CAA] has reserved to the states. 1 42 This notion has steadfastly
remained untouched, even after the 1990 CAA Amendments.1 43
Unambiguously, the statute provides exactly when the EPA may
"run roughshod" and usurp this power reserved to the states-that
is, only when a state's plan is ineffective in attaining the air quality
standards or the state has completely failed to implement a plan. 144
Notably, the CAA ensures states an opportunity to avoid an EPA-
imposed federal plan by submitting a state plan.1 45 This insurance,
section 7410(a)(1), provides:
Each State shall, after reasonable notice and public hearings,
adopt and submit to the Administrator, within 3 years (or such
shorter period as the Administrator may prescribe) after the
promulgation of a national primary ambient air quality stand-
ard .... a plan which provides for implementation, mainte-
nance, and enforcement of such primary standard in each air
quality control region ... within such State.1 46
This provision is an example of the cooperative federalism dy-
namic that the CAA has pioneered. It empowers the states to first
139. 421 U.S. 60, 78 (1975).
140. Id. at 79.
141. Id.
142. Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Gorsuch, 742 F.2d 1028, 1036-37 (7th Cir. 1984) (noting
that this is especially true when the EPA is overriding state policy).
143. Virginia v. EPA, 108 F.3d 1397, 1410 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
144. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410(c)(1)(A)-(B).
145. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2). The state plan must comply with the requirements as set
forth in 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2). Id.
146. Id. at § 7410(a)(1).
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solve their air pollution problem by creating a state plan, and if
there is failure to do so or if the plan is inadequate, then the federal
government can supplant the state plan with its attainment plan. 147
The Transport Rule acts to directly undermine this cooperative
dynamic because the EPA failed to inform the states how they
would define "contribute significantly" until the moment that the
Transport Rule was promulgated while concurrently implementing
federal plans. 148 According to the states, implementing state plans
is their statutory entitlement. 149 The EPA undermined this statu-
tory guarantee when it failed to inform the states how they should
quantify states' Good Neighbor obligations.150
In response, the EPA asserted that for every state that it prom-
ulgated a federal plan, the agency determined that the state's sub-
mission of its state-plan was overdue or had been met with EPA
disapproval. 51 As such, the EPA had not only the authority, but
also what they classified as a "mandatory duty" to implement fed-
eral plans for those states.1 52 Reinforcing its point, the EPA con-
tended that even if it could be concluded that the states did not have
an opportunity to provide state plans, the states still had the same
data available to them concerning nonattainment levels as were
available to the EPA.153 Thus, the EPA argued that armed with
this data, states needed to make policy judgments about how much
to emit within their own borders and necessarily have to take into
account the likely contribution that goes into their neighboring
states.1 54 As such, the EPA viewed the states that did not have a
state plan submitted to the EPA for approval as being in default of
their obligation.1 55 Stated differently, the operative antecedent to
147. 42 U.S.C. § 7410. Other provisions of the CAA also prescribe this cooperative feder-
alism dynamic. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7589(c)(2)(F) (authorizing the EPA to establish an ade-
quate clean-fuel program only if California does not); 42 U.S.C. § 765 1e(b) (authorizing the
EPA to allocate certain emissions allowances only if states do not). Additionally, when a
state plan or program is insufficient (rather than omitted) to meet the requirements of an
EPA regulation, the CAA authorizes the EPA to step in. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7412(l)(5)
(addressing this notion in hazardous air pollutants programs); id. at 7424(b) (addressing this
notion for fuel-burning sources); id. at § 7661a(d)(1) (addressing this notion for permit pro-
grams).
148. Brief for State and Local Respondents, supra note 138, at *16.
149. Id. at *56.
150. See id. at *22.




154. See Oral Argument, supra note 119.
155. In default of the obligation of the states to have their respective plan within three
years of the relevant NAAQS. Brief for Federal Petitioners, supra note 28, at *30-31.
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a state plan is issuance of the NAAQS, not issuance of a fully-quan-
tified Good Neighbor obligation. 156 Because the NAAQS were avail-
able, the states needed to have viable state plans regardless of when
the EPA solidified the Transport Rule and quantified states' Good
Neighbor obligations. 157 The states' default of their state-plan-first
requirement is the foundation upon which the EPA asserted its au-
thority allowing it to implement federal plans when the Transport
Rule was promulgated.5 8 According to the EPA, this fit squarely
within its interpretation of section 7410(c)(1) of the CAA-and the
Court agreed.159
However, a self-proclaimed correct interpretation of a statute has
no merit; the constitutional constraints of Chevron provides:
When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute
which it administers, it is confronted with two questions. First,
always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken
to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is
clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the
agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent
of Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has
not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court
does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as
would be necessary in the absence of an administrative inter-
pretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with
respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is
whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible con-
struction of the statute.160
Accordingly, the EPA's actions in implementing a federal plan on
the same day that it promulgated the Transport Rule must be di-
rectly supported by the language of the Good Neighbor Provision in
order to be a congressionally authorized authority. However, as per
156. Id.
157. See id. at *16.
158. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410.
159. See id.; see also EPA v. Homer City Generation, 134 S. Ct. 1584, 1588 (2014). As the
Court saw it, once the EPA issues any new or revised NAAQS, a state "shall" propose a state
plan within three years, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1), and that state plan "shall" in-
clude, inter alia, provisions adequate to satisfy the Good Neighbor Provision, pursuant to §
7410(a)(2). Id. If the EPA were to find a state plan inadequate after the issuance of the new
or revised NAAQS, the EPA has the statutory "duty" to issue a federal plan "at any time"
within two years. Id. According to the Court, "[n]othing in the [CAA] differentiates the Good
Neighbor Provision from the several other matters a state must address in its state
plan... [n]or does the [CAA] condition the duty to promulgate a [federal plan] on [the] EPA's
having first quantified an upwind [s]tate's good neighbor obligations." Id. at 1589-90.
160. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
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Chevron's mandate, to say that the intent of Congress is clear-that
Congress has "directly spoken to the precise question at issue"-is
a foundationless claim. Section 7410(a)(1), the provision of the CAA
that calls for a state plan imposition before a federal plan, is notice-
ably silent to the "precise question at issue." That precise issue is
whether the EPA can undermine state-first implementation of a
newly promulgated rule when the states had no prior knowledge of
how the EPA was going to quantify their Good Neighbor require-
ments. In applying the Chevron test, the statute does not address
the specific issue. As a result, Congress has not spoken directly to
the precise issue and therefore fails under the first prong of the
Chevron test. 161 Therefore, analysis into Chevron's second prong is
implicated.
The pivotal question-and the second prong of Chevron-in de-
termining whether the EPA's construction of a provision is valid,
turns on whether its interpretation is reasonable. 162 There is no
reasonable ground to support frustrating an indispensable province
of the CAA-cooperative federalism. The EPA supplanted the
states' fundamental power when it failed to inform the states how
it would quantify their Good Neighbor obligations within the new
Transport Rule. The states never had any opportunity to comply
with the new Transport Rule before the EPA implemented federal
plans. 63
In the past, the EPA has repeatedly acknowledged the need to
give states a reasonable opportunity to implement newly promul-
gated obligations through state plans after a final rule quantifies
the Good Neighbor Provision.1 64 In CAIR, the EPA stated:
[Where the data and analytical] tools and information may not
be available [to identify a significant contribution from upwind
states to nonattainment areas in downwind states,] [i]n such
circumstances, [a state's] section [74]10(a)(2)(D) [state imple-
mentation plan] submission should indicate that the necessary
information is not available at the time the submission is made
or that, based on the information available, the State believes
161. Id.
162. Id. (stating that the agency's interpretation must be based on a "permissible con-
struction of the statute.").
163. See Brief for State and Local Respondents, supra note 138, at *57.
164. Id. at *59.
656 Vol. 53
The Transport Rule
that no significant contribution to downwind nonattainment
exists.16 5
Furthermore, the EPA rightfully claims that the statute calls for
states to implement their own plans within three years of the prom-
ulgated NAAQS, which facially seems as if the states have no other
alternative than creating a state plan-even in the face of an un-
quantified regulation that they need to follow. 166 This, however, is
not the case. Yet again in CAIR, the EPA identified section
7410(k)(5) of the CAA as the vehicle to utilize when there are new
obligations, stating:
The EPA can always act at a later time after the initial section
[74] 10(a)(2)(D) submissions to issue a call under [74] 10(k)(5) to
States to revise their [state plans] to provide for additional
emission controls to satisfy the section [74]10(a)(2)(D) obliga-
tions if such action were warranted based upon subsequently-
available data and analyses.16 7
In turn, the EPA did not rely on its own precedent. Rather, the
EPA implemented its federal plans without giving the states the
opportunity to revise their plans first after they were made aware
of their Good Neighbor Provision obligations. This does not heed
cooperative federalism, but rather, usurps that design.
The United States Supreme Court, however, agreed with the
EPA: "By altering Congress' [state plan and federal plan] schedule,
the D.C. Circuit allowed a delay Congress did not order and placed
an information submission obligation on [the] EPA Congress did not
impose."16 8 The EPA eschewed any usurpation of the cooperative
federalism dynamic by stating that states routinely undertake tech-
nically complex air quality determinations and that emissions in-
formation from all states is publicly available.16 9 But "[a]ll the sci-
entific knowledge in the world is useless if the States are left to
165. CAIR, supra note 35, at 25,263. However, see contra EPA v. Homer City Generation,
134 S.Ct. 1584, 1589 (2014) ("The fact that [the] EPA had previously accorded upwind [s]tates
a chance to allocate emission budgets among their in-state sources does not show that the
Agency acted arbitrarily by refraining to do so here.").
166. See Brief for Federal Petitioners, supra note 28, at *16.
167. CAIR, supra note 35, at 25,263-64. Succinctly put, if the EPA promulgates a new
rule, it can issue a directive to the states to reform their current plans to comport to the new
rule after it has been quantified, rather than forcing states to comport to an EPA rule that
yet has defined parameters for states to satisfy.
168. EPA v. Homer City Generation, 134 S. Ct. 1584, 1589 (2014).
169. Brief for Federal Petitioners, supra note 28, at 29.
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guess the way in which [the] EPA might ultimately quantify 'signif-
icance."' 170  As the D.C. Circuit Court explained, this results in
"punish[ing] the states for failing to meet a standard that the EPA
had not yet announced and [it] did not yet know. ' 171 The United
States Supreme Court has even stated:
It is one thing to expect regulated parties to conform their con-
duct to an agency's interpretations once the agency announces
them; it is quite another to require regulated parties to divine
the agency's interpretations in advance or else be held liable
when the agency announces its interpretations for the first
time ... and demands deference.1
72
In a statutory scheme such as the CAA that was borne upon the
foundations of cooperative federalism, this principle is the corner-
stone. The EPA failed to adhere to this mainstay and as such, its
interpretation is manifestly unreasonable; it fails the second prong
of the Chevron test and should not have been given deference.1 73
It should be noted that it is true, there is nothing stopping the
states from issuing a counter state plan to replace the implemented
federal plan;1 74 however, the availability of this possibility does not
render the EPA's federal-plan-first strategy moot-let alone, harm-
less. The EPA must comply with the cooperative federalist ideals
set forth in the CAA. The presence of a post-injury remedy is merely
palliative; it is an exception trying to prove the rule and does not
make the initial injury any less unconstitutional.
CONCLUSION
Addressing the constitutionality of the EPA's promulgation of the
Transport Rule entails delving no deeper than into the maxims of
administrative law. Since President Roosevelt's era, a Court cul-
ture of seemingly per se deference to agencies has reigned supreme.
This put agencies like the EPA on a pedestal of great power. With
great power, however, comes the risk of abuse. Deference regimes
have been present since the early portions of the twentieth century;
however, Chevron seemingly solidified the extreme deference to
170. Brief for Federal Petitioners, supra note 28, at 50.
171. EME Homer City Generation v. EPA, 696 F.3d 7, 28 (D.C. Cir. 2012). Elaborating
further, the court explained that it is like asking the states "to hit the target ... before the
EPA defines [it]," it requires the states "to take [a] stab in the dark," and "sets the States up
to fail." Id.
172. Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2168 (2012).
173. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43 (Chevron second prong).
174. See Oral Argument, supra note 119.
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which administrative agencies are entitled. 175 Knowledge of this
deference has allowed administrative agencies to make policy-
based decisions, perhaps grounded upon good motives and impres-
sionable problem-solving, but nonetheless lacking statutory author-
ization. The EPA did exactly that when it defined "significantly
contribute" in the CAA based exclusively upon cost-considerations;
when it: (1) failed to prevent over-control and ensure that the
amount of ambient air pollutant particles that each state needs to
abate is in proportion to its contribution to downwind nonattain-
ment; and (2) ignored the fundamental premise of the CAA-that
is, cooperative federalism-by implementing federal plans on the
same day that the Transport Rule was promulgated and thereby
ignoring the mandated initial call to the states.
For both the "significant contributor" and federal-plan-first is-
sues, the EPA is seemingly acting upon illogical stretches in inter-
preting the CAA, and the Court deferred to the same; hook, line,
and sinker. "Post-Chevron, statutes no longer possess a single pre-
scriptive meaning on many questions; rather, they describe .. .a
'policy space,' a range of permissible interpretive discretion, within
which a variety of decisions that the agency might make would be
legally defensible to varying degrees." 176 This is exactly what the
EPA purported and the Court agreed with-unconstitutional, pol-
icy-based interpretations in the hope that the Court would employ
the most forgiving deferential regime in its favor.
Unfortunately, the EPA has faulty foundation and has failed to
anchor its rules to statutory authority in almost every attempt it
has made to promulgate a rule to address cross-state air contami-
nation. The EPA cannot meet the requirements of Chevron defer-
ence because of its lack of statutory authority-its only source of
rule-making power.1 77 Allowing the EPA to rule-make without ex-
press support from the statute it purports to effectuate allows ad-
ministrative agencies to gain greater power than they were de-
signed to have. In agreeing with the EPA, the Court allowed the
same and in effect composed its own intoxicating siren song, luring
administrative agencies like the EPA to run roughshod over con-
gressional-and truly, the people's-prerogative. This blind defer-
ence runs the risk of transmogrifying the country's political culture
from that of a series of checks and balances of decisions made by
175. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 837.
176. Elliot, supra note 7, at 11-12.
177. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140; Chevron, 467 U.S. 837 (1984); Eskridge & Baer, supra
note 86, at 1098.
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the people vis-A-vis their elected officials to a trickle-down bureau-
cracy; that is, the high Court giving the authority to non-elected
officials to make decisions.
The true problem lies not with a bad idea on the part of the EPA;
its expertise in tackling this difficult problem should not be margin-
alized. The true problem is that even if its promulgations are effec-
tive, the EPA is missing a statutory anchor allowing it to rule-make
as it sees fit; "[r]egardless of how serious the problem an adminis-
trative agency seeks to address .... it may not exercise its authority
in a manner that is inconsistent with the administrative structure
that Congress enacted into law."178
The CAA has not been amended since 1990 and the technology
available since then has increased at an exponential rate. Thus, as
written, the Good Neighbor Provision is time-stamped in 1990; it
fails to reflect the up-to-date progress on cross-state air contamina-
tion-that is, the language fails to grant the authority best suited
to solve the amorphous problem. It seems clear that a less soph-
omoric amendment to the Good Neighbor Provision within the CAA
might be the key to allowing the EPA to use its expertise and regu-
late according to the intelligence and technology currently availa-
ble. A statute that can provide the authority for a cap and trade
system or an unprecedented superfund allows for the flexibility that
the EPA needs to effectively regulate the spaghetti-like matrix that
is air pollution, rather than being tethered to the congressional
province of twenty-five years ago. Unfortunately, as it stays, like
the pollutant particles crossing state lines and creating growing
problems downwind, the EPA has also crossed its line; the Court
erred when it upheld the EPA's interpretation of the CAA and the
Transport Rule.
178. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 125 (2000) (internal cita-
tions omitted).
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